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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4738
The increase in food prices represents a major crisis for 
the world’s poor. This paper aims to review the evidence 
on the potential impact of higher food prices on poverty 
in sub-Saharan Africa, and examines the extent to which 
policy responses will benefit the poor. The paper shows 
that rising food prices are likely to lead to higher poverty 
in sub-Saharan Africa as the negative impact on net poor 
consumers outweighs the benefits to poor producers. 
A recent survey shows that the most common policy 
response in sub-Saharan African countries is reducing 
taxes on food while outside the region price controls 
or targeted consumer subsidies are the most popular 
This paper—a product of the Development Dialogue on Values and Ethics, Human Development Network, and of the 
Poverty Reduction Group, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network—is part of a larger study by the Africa 
Chief Economist Office and the Development Dialogue on Values and Ethics on the impact of the food price crisis in 
Africa and the policy responses available to governments. This research was started in the Africa PREM department and 
benefits from funding from the Africa Region Regional Studies Program as well as the  Belgium and Luxemburg Poverty 
Reduction Partnerships. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The 
authors may be contacted at qwodon@worldbank.org and hzaman@worldbank.org. 
measure. Sub-Saharan African countries also have a 
higher prevalence of food-based safety net programs 
which are being scaled up to respond to rising prices. The 
review suggests that the benefits from reducing import 
tariffs on staples may accrue largely to the non-poor. 
Social protection programs show more promise, but 
geographic targeting is likely to be crucial in ensuring 
that benefits reach the neediest. The paper also argues 
that anti-poverty interventions ought to retain their focus 
on rural areas where poverty remains highest even after 
taking into account the adverse impact on the urban poor 
due to the rise in food prices.  Rising Food Prices in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
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1 This paper and the broader research project it is part of have benefitted from discussions and/or comments among 
others with Douglas Addison, Harold Alderman, Antonella Bassani, Shanta Devarajan, Hinh Dinh, Wilfried Engelke, 
Louise Fox, Delfin Go, Ana Revenga, Tahrat Shahid, Sudhir Shetty, Kenneth Simler, Linda Van Gelder, and Jan 
Walliser. All potential mistakes or omissions remain obviously ours.   1. Introduction 
From 1974 to 2005 food prices on world markets fell by three quarters in real terms. Recent price 
increases have reversed this trend.  Since April 2007, wheat prices have doubled and almost every crop 
(maize, milk, oilseeds, etc.) is at or near a peak in nominal terms.  Rice prices tripled between January and 
April 2008.  There are differing views on the relative importance of the main factors which have driven 
prices up. However there is a general consensus that a combination of policy decisions (export bans by key 
wheat and rice producers and the use of foodgrains to produce biofuels) and global market trends (higher 
energy prices, a depreciating dollar and increased foodgrain demand) have been the main causes (Mitchell 
2008).  
  Rising world prices have different pass-through effects on domestic prices depending on import 
trade regimes, price controls and domestic market structures. While these pass-through effects vary 
considerably, it is clear that higher inflation has become a major socio-political issue and has led to social 
unrest across all continents (examples include Uzbekhistan, Mexico, Pakistan and Cameroon).  There have 
been significant increases in food price inflation in 2007/08 ranging from the Kyrgyz Republic (32%) to 
Vietnam (26%) and Chile (16%).  In countries from the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
where inflation has traditionally been low, several countries have experienced double digit inflation, with 
significantly higher increases in food prices. This higher inflation has led to concerns that poverty might 
increase substantially and rapidly in many countries (FAO 2007; World Bank 2008a).  Recent analysis of 
the potential impact on the poor of higher food prices has confirmed these fears (e.g. Ivanic and Martin 
2007)
2. Beyond the immediate impact of higher food prices on the cost of the food purchased by 
households, there is evidence that higher overall inflation hurts the poor the most (Easterly and Fischer 
2001; Ravallion and Datt 2002).  
  The current crisis could have long-term negative effects.  If higher food prices lead to lower caloric 
intake and an increase in child malnutrition, this could have additional negative effects (e.g. Del Rosso 
1999; Alderman et al. 2006).  There is also evidence that when households are faced with large negative 
shocks, they may sell their productive assets such as seeds and livestock, thereby jeopardizing their future 
earnings prospects (Carter et al. 2004; Fafchamps et al. 1998; Jalan and Ravallion 2002; Lokshin and 
Ravallion 2000; see also World Bank 2008b for a discussion).   
  The policy responses which countries have used to address the current crisis are essentially three 
fold (Zaman et al. 2008). The first are “economy-wide” policies to stabilize domestic food prices that are 
clearly important since the ability of households to shift consumption patterns is especially limited for 
staple foods (Tyers and Anderson 1992).  The second are social protection and human development 
                                                 
2 On the issue of the impact of changes in prices on the poor, there is a related literature focusing on the impact of 
trade reforms (see among others Chen and Ravallion, 2004; Hertel and Winters, 2006; Hertel et al., 2004). programs which are meant to cushion the impact of higher prices on the poor (World Bank 2008b). The 
third are programs and policies to boost domestic food production both over the immediate and medium 
run.   
  The present paper seeks to provide evidence on a few questions arising from the rise in global 
prices with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa. First to what extent have the poor in Africa been affected by 
these price rises? Second what types of policies have been put in place and how do responses in Africa 
differ from the rest of the world? Third, to what extent are the policies implemented in Africa targeted to 
the poor and how can they be improved?  
  The paper is divided into two main sections – poverty impacts and policy response. It starts by 
discussing a standard methodological approach to estimating the poverty impact of rising food prices. It 
then moves to presenting estimated changes in poverty due to higher prices, focusing on recent work in 
several African countries. This ‘poverty impact’ section concludes by illustrating the relevance of using 
poverty maps to show how the impact of these price rises varies within a country.  The policy response 
section begins by comparing the way sub-Saharan African countries are responding to rising food prices 
with other countries.  It also discusses the merits of possible policy responses by examining the extent to 
which three common responses – reducing import tariffs and expanding feeding and public works programs 
– benefit the poor.  
 
2.  Assessing the Distributional and Poverty Impact of Price Rises 
2.1. Methodological  Issues 
  The analysis of the distributional impact of price rises follows a simple methodology outlined by 
Singh et al. (1987) and Deaton (1989, 1997).  Deaton (1989) defines a ‘net consumption ratio’ as the 
elasticity of the cost of living with respect to changes in prices. For net producers this elasticity is negative 
and for net consumers it is positive. In his work in Thailand Deaton showed that middle class farmers 
benefited most from a price rise relative to either the poorest or wealthy rural households. These methods 
were subsequently applied among others by Barret and Dorosh (1996) using data from Madagascar, Budd 
(1993) in Cote d’Ivoire and Klytchnikova and Diop (2006) in Bangladesh. The argument made is that the 
non-parametric techniques implicit in Deaton’s methodology do not impose any structure on the data and 
hence make full use of the information available. Analyses of the recent food price rises also use this 
method as well as simple summary statistics (Ivanic and Martin 2008 and Wodon et al. 2008a).  
  Deaton’s framework can be summarized as follows. The change in welfare following a change in 
prices for a household is: 
  () [] i i i i L CR PR p w η + − Δ = Δ  where   is the welfare effect expressed in percentage terms of the baseline income or consumption level 
of household i,   is the percentage change in food prices (this can be estimated for one or more food 
consumption items), PR is the food production ratio (at the aggregate level for a household, this can be 
proxied by the household’s agricultural sales divided by its total income or consumption, but it is also 
feasible to analyze this variable for various food items one by one), CR is the food expenditure ratio (which 
at the aggregate household level is captured by the household’s food consumption divided its total income 




is the wage rate elasticity with respect to food price changes and L is the labor share in total household 
income or consumption.  
  The interpretation of the above equation is straightforward.  If a household is a net seller of food (in 
the aggregate or for any specific food item) PR will be larger than CR and the household will benefit from 
the price increase.  By contrast, if the household is a net purchaser of food, the first term in the above 
equation will be negative.  As to the second term, it captures the potential compensating effect of higher 
wages, for example for those households who have some of their members providing wage labor in food-
producing farms.  While the framework is very simple, there are a number of implicit assumptions 
embedded in it that we will need to carefully consider.  There may also be issues with estimating the 
variables in that equation.  For example, depending on data availability we can estimate the wage elasticity 
directly or use a range of plausible estimates from other work and carry out sensitivity analysis.  In the 
absence of good estimates of these wage elasticities (especially in sub-Saharan Africa), researchers may 
also decide to compute short- term effects by not including the potential gains through wages.  Following 
Deaton’s methodology, beyond statistical point estimates of the impact of higher food prices, one may also 
estimate non-parametric kernel regressions by location, by net market position, by occupation etc.  
  The distinction between the short and long run impact of price rises is also important. Ravallion 
(1990 and 2000) uses data from Bangladesh and India to argue that while in the short run the rural poor are 
adversely affected when the relative price of food rises, the impact in the long run can be neutral after 
adjusting for changes in wage rates. This result is due to the increased price elasticity of the wage rate to 
the price of foodgrains in the long run. However, the extent to which wages do in fact respond to changes 
in food prices has been called into question by Rashid (2002). Using time series data the author argues that 
since the mid- eighties changes in rice prices have had a negligible impact on agricultural wages in 
Bangladesh. Using data from a number of African countries, Christaensen and Demery (2006) extend this 
analysis of second-round effects by including an additional effect of increased farm productivity arising 
from the increase in price of food staples. Their main conclusion is that policies leading to higher food 
prices are likely to increase poverty, even after factoring in countervailing wage and productivity effects.    A limitation with using partial equilibrium analysis to assess the impact of price rises is that it does 
not take into account the economy-wide impacts of changes in relative prices. There are different ways to 
look at the issue, starting from simple simulations using Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) to more 
complex Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models.  SAMs have for example been used to trace the 
multiplier effects of the recent price shocks in Africa (e.g. Nganou et al. 2008; Parra and Wodon 2008), but 
before reaching any firmer conclusions it would be better to have the results of more complex CGE models 
that can accommodate induced impacts such as changes in labor markets, the knock-on impacts on other 
industries from changes in wages in selected sectors, and the effects on outputs and prices of these 
industries. It is because only limited work on the impact of the recent food price crisis has been done to 
date with CGEs in sub-Saharan Africa that we focus the following discussion of the African experience on 
simple partial equilibrium analysis.   
By contrast, much more CGE work is available for Asian countries.  For example, a CGE model 
was used in Indonesia to assess the impact of changing rice tariffs (SMERU 2003).  The results suggested 
that the overall welfare impact from the proposed change in rice tariffs was small in relation to average 
household income, but that this effect varied significantly across household groups. Specifically the 
increase in real wages for unskilled workers was insufficient to make up for the increased living costs for 
the poor. Imports of rice were actually banned in Indonesia after 2004.  Warr (2005) found that the ban 
raised the price of domestically produced rice which led to an increase in poverty (see also Timmer and 
Dawe 2007 on the Asian experience with rice policies).  Another paper on Indonesia by Sumarto et al. 
(2005) suggests rice subsidies helped to reduce household vulnerability (see also previous research on 
Indonesia by Ravallion and van de Walle 1991).  In Vietnam, Niimi et al. (2004) and Minot and Goletti 
(2000) found that liberalizing rice exports helped reduce poverty due to higher production and despite an 
increase in domestic prices.   
 
2.2. Global  Estimates 
Clearly, an increase in food prices will have uneven impacts across countries and population 
groups. At the macroeconomic level, countries that are net food exporters will experience improved terms 
of trade, while net food importers will face increased costs in meeting domestic demand. There are about 
four times more net cereal-importing countries in the world than net exporters (IFPRI 2007). Almost all 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa are net importers of cereals, and therefore likely to be affected negatively. 
The vulnerability of poor households is also related to the extent that locally consumed staples are traded 
on international markets. This varies from 24% in Ethiopia to 64% in Vietnam (World Bank 2007). 
  Price rises hurt net consumers of food and the 2007 World Development Report provides estimates 
on the share of households who are net sellers or buyers of staple food.  The data suggest that in four out of seven surveyed countries (Bolivia, Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Zambia) the poor are net consumers, while in 
three others (Cambodia, Madagascar and Vietnam) they are net producers. Most other empirical analyses 
suggest that the poor are net consumers (e.g., Poulten et al. 2006; Christiansen and Demery 2007) and 
therefore would be hurt from an increase in food prices. The urban poor are clearly in most cases net 
consumers and are likely to be adversely affected by an increase in food prices. Urban wage rates are also 
unlikely to adjust to increases in food prices, at least in the short run.  Effects on the rural poor are likely to 
be more country-specific but on average they are worse off when prices rise. This is due to the fact that the 
poor in rural areas are often constrained by small landholdings, input costs and distance to markets, and 
hence are generally unable to produce the marketable surplus required to exceed their food expenditures.  
  Ivanic and Martin (2007) use household survey data for several countries and apply the Deaton 
framework to estimate the poverty impact of global price changes for seven key staples between 2005 and 
2007. They also use a CGE model to simulate the increase in wages for unskilled agricultural labor that 
would follow from the food price increase under various assumptions. Their results show that the effects of 
rising commodity prices on poverty differ considerably between countries and commodities, but that 
poverty increases are considerably more frequent and larger than poverty reductions. Urban households are 
typically hit harder than rural households, though many in rural areas are also net consumers of food and 
therefore adversely affected by price rises. The average impact of a 10% increase for seven key food items 
is to raise the poverty headcount ratio by 0.4 percentage point.  
  In addition to the simulated 10% price shock, the authors also produce rough estimates of the 
poverty impact of the global food price increases between 2005 and 2007. The variations across countries 
are clear – with large poverty increases in Nicaragua, Zambia, Pakistan, and Madagascar and poverty 
reduction in Peru and Vietnam (where a significant number of poor households are net rice producers). 
Moreover they show that the effect of a relatively small 10% change in prices can be a first order 
approximation for the impact of a larger change but some results vary significantly depending on the extent 
of clustering of households around the poverty line. In rural Peru, for instance, the impact of a 20% price 
rise on the poverty headcount is five times greater than that of a 10% rise. If one were to derive global 
estimates of the poverty impact of rising food prices by generalizing the results from these eight countries 
the results would depend significantly on assumptions of the extent to which global prices are passed 
through to domestic consumers. A pass-through rate of 0.66, for example, translates into a 4.5 percentage 
point increase in the $1/day poverty headcount ratio, or an additional 105 million people in poverty. On the 
other hand, if we assume the pass-through rate is only 0.33 there would be an additional 45 million poor 
people. Clearly, there are caveats to this analysis. Aside from price pass-through rates which generate 
vastly different estimates global estimates are based on the somewhat heroic assumption that these eight 
countries are representative of the world population.  The impact on the poverty headcount only conveys part of the story of the impact of these price 
rises. A recent paper shows that 88% of the increase in urban poverty depth due to the global increase in 
food prices is from poor households becoming poorer and only 12% from households falling into poverty 
(Dessus et al., 2008). This is consistent with evidence from the Indonesian financial crisis in the late 1990s 
where the impact on poverty depth was higher than on the headcount (Skoufias et al., 2000), as well as with 
the evidence provided for West and Central Africa by Wodon et al. (2008). Hence, policy responses ought 
to focus less on identifying the ‘new poor’ and more on scaling up anti-poverty interventions for the 
existing poor. Moreover the strains caused by higher food prices may lead to distress sales of assets which 
will aggravate chronic poverty.  There is evidence that, over the medium run, households adjust their 
production and consumption in the face of higher prices (Deaton 1997, Porto 2005).  In the short run, 
households smooth their consumption by increasing their labor supply and drawing down their savings. 
However, when families have to disinvest in their livelihoods—eating their seed grain, selling their animals 
— they will be challenged to rebuild their earning capacities and increase the risk of chronic poverty. 
Inadequate credit markets can exacerbate these constraints
3 as the poor are often forced to borrow from 
moneylenders at high rates of interest.  
The costs to human development outcomes particularly for poor children may be irreversible. As 
households face shocks to their real income, they eat less and switch from more expensive sources of 
protein such as fish, meat, and eggs to cheaper coarse cereals.  This switch will cause micro-nutrient 
deficiencies (in iron, iodine and essential vitamins). The poor, moreover, will be forced to cut back on 
calorie intake, leading to weight loss and acute malnutrition. Evidence from economic crises in the past has 
shown that the most susceptible are children under 24 months of age, pregnant and lactating women, and 
those already suffering from malnourishment (Alderman et al 2006, Pongou et al 2005). The adverse 
impact of shocks on schooling is also well documented (Escobal et al 2005, Duryea 2006). Evidence from a 
recent survey in Bangladesh suggests that about half the households surveyed reduced spending on 
education to cope with rising food prices. Policy responses to minimize the potential effects of higher food 
and fuel prices on schooling are thus essential as even a temporary gap in attendance can impose serious 
costs in a child’s educational attainment. 
                                                 
3 Adequate access to credit can help families avoid negative coping strategies, but the poor often lack access to credit or 
have access only on particularly onerous terms (for example, from moneylenders). Where credit is available, it can lead to 
large indebtedness, which can have repercussions on family welfare for years to come. 2.3.  Estimates from Sub-Saharan Africa 
A review of the poverty impact work carried out in sub-Saharan Africa suggests that we currently 
have more evidence for West and Central Africa than other parts of the region. The Deaton framework was 
applied to more than a dozen West and Central African countries to simulate the poverty impact of a range 
of price increases of key imported staples by Wodon et al. (2008a). The authors consider only the short 
term impact on poverty of higher food prices, as estimated by looking at the consumption and production of 
food by households, without taking wage effects into account.  For comparability purposes, all the 
simulations are based on the same price increases – 25% and 50% - for all countries and food items (the 
detailed country studies consider many other intermediate price changes and are based on country-specific 
poverty lines).  In order to provide poverty estimates, as for other work, a number of assumptions are made 
in the analysis.  For example, the authors assume that the cost of an increase in food prices for a household 
translates into an equivalent reduction of its consumption in real terms.  This means that they do not take 
into account the price elasticity of demand which may lead to substitution effects thereby helping offset 
part of the negative effect of higher prices for certain food items.   
  Importantly, the authors present estimates using both the standard Deaton methodology where both 
consumers and producers face the same price increases, as well as a variant of this where only consumers 
are assumed to face this price increase. In Africa, at least two factors may dilute the impact of rising global 
prices on the domestic prices which local farmers face.  First, market intermediaries may be able in some 
cases to keep a large share of the increase in consumer prices for themselves without paying farmers much 
more for their crops.  Second, poor physical connectivity in many countries also contributes to the sluggish 
transmission of global price changes to local producers (Benson 2008). Since this price transmission factor 
is difficult to assess the authors present estimates obtained when considering only the impact on consumers 
as an upper bound of the impact of the rise in prices on poverty, and interpret the results obtained when 
factoring in a proportional increase in incomes for net sellers as a lower bound of the impact. 
  Another factor that may limit the benefits of higher food prices for farmers is the fact that the cost 
of inputs such as fertilizers is rising as well in part due to higher oil prices.  Even if the increase in input 
costs for farmers does not affect the prices paid to them, it does affect their profit, which is ultimately what 
matters for welfare and poverty analysis.  This increase in input costs is another reason why when 
simulating the potential impacts of changing economic conditions on poverty, impacts obtained by 
considering food price changes for both consumers and producers should be considered as a lower bound, 
with the consumer side effects only taken as an upper bound.  
  At the national level, upper bound estimates obtained by Wodon et al. (2008a) suggest that the 
increase in the headcount index of poverty following from a 50% increase in selected food prices varies 
from 1.8 percentage point in Ghana to 9.6 points in Senegal.  The differences in impacts are due in part to the fact that the sets of goods considered for the simulations in various countries represent different shares 
of total consumption.  In Ghana the staples included in the analysis account for 8% of total consumption 
versus 21% in Senegal.  Another factor that affects the magnitude of the impacts is the degree to which the 
diet of the population is diversified.  This is important because the increase in food prices has been 
concentrated (or at least has been steeper) in a few internationally traded commodities such as rice.  In a 
country such as Liberia, where much of the diet is based on rice, the impact of the increase in food prices 
on poverty is greater than a country like Uganda where there are multiple staple food items (Benson 2008).   
  As discussed in more detail below, impacts vary not only between countries, but also between 
urban and rural areas within countries.  In many countries, poverty impacts are larger in percentage points 
in urban than in rural areas, but this is not always the case.  In Ghana, Senegal, and Liberia, the poverty 
impact is actually larger in rural areas than in urban areas.  In Ghana, this is essentially because poverty is 
low in urban areas in comparison to other countries.  As Ghana’s urban population is better off, only a 
small percentage of urban dwellers fall into poverty with the price shock.  In Senegal and Liberia, this is in 
part because a large share of food consumption in the country is imported, so that rural households are not 
protected to the same extent from the price shock through production for auto-consumption.  Moreover, the 
authors find typically that poverty impacts are largest in urban areas outside of the capital again because in 
the capital, households tend to have higher consumption levels so that they can better cope with the shock.  
  With a 50% increase in prices the average increase in the poverty headcount is 4.4 percentage 
points when only the impact on the consumer side is taken into account.  This falls to 2.5 percentage points 
when the positive impact on producer incomes is accounted for.  Figure 1 provides a comparison of the 
upper and lower bound estimates at the national level (Senegal is not included in the Figure because the 
survey does not include data on producers, so that the lower bound impact cannot be estimated).  The 
differences are smallest for Niger, Liberia, and Gabon.  These are three countries with substantial net 
imports of food. In addition, in Liberia and Niger, while local food production is important, much of this 
local production is auto-consumed, and thereby is not taken into account either in the upper or in the lower 
bound poverty estimates.   In urban areas, the average upper bound impact across all countries is 5.2 
percentage points, and this falls to 3.7 points with producer gains.  This drop may appear to be large, but 
many urban households are net producers of food, especially outside of the capital cities.  In rural areas, the 
average upper bound impact is 4.1 points, falling to 2.2 points when factoring in producer gains.  These 
impacts are large.  For example, an average 3.5 percentage point impact at the national level for all of sub-
Saharan Africa, which has a total population of more than 800 million, would imply that the food crisis 
could lead to an increase in poverty of close to 30 million persons.  In addition, all households who are 
already in poverty would be even poorer.  
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Source: Wodon et al. (2008a).  Impacts are estimated for a 50% increase in food prices. 
 
There is also some evidence of the food price impact in East Africa. Loening and Oseni (2007) 
focus on the extent to which various groups in Ethiopia are affected by the increase in food prices between 
2000 and 2007. This is again carried out by assessing whether households are net producers or consumers 
and estimating a labor wage response to these changed prices. The analysis shows that the poorest 
households, even in rural areas, will be adversely affected by rise in prices. However the average rural 
household will benefit with an increase in welfare of about 4% due to the food price rises between 2000 
and 2007.  By contrast the real income of urban households will fall by 8%.  The interface between 
conflict, rising food prices and droughts is particularly dangerous. It is estimated that approximately 15% of 
the Ethiopian population require emergency food aid particularly those in the Eastern part of the country 
where a mix of drought and civil conflict have led to widespread food insecurity. In Somalia, between one-
third and a half of the population are facing serious food shortages. Due to rising food prices many are now 
either skipping meals or switching to cheaper cereals (World Bank 2008a). 
  In contrast, analysis carried out in June 2008 in Uganda suggests that the country has remained 
relatively insulated from the global food price rises although staple prices are showing a gradual upward 
trend (Benson 2008). A diversified staple diet, with a large share of staples derived from local products 
(matooke, tubers and potatoes) is a key factor behind the moderate trend in local food prices. The author 
assesses which types of households are most at risk and argues that those for whom maize constitutes a 
large share of calorie intake are potentially vulnerable. Maize is the one staple crop which is affected by 
international price changes, and constitutes 16% of the average Ugandan calorie intake.  However for the urban poor maize is 26% of the diet and for Internally Displaced People in World Food Program camps it is 
41% of their calorie intake.  
 
2.4.  Using Poverty Mapping Techniques to Assess Local Impacts 
The above analysis considers likely poverty impacts of higher food prices at the aggregate national, 
urban, or rural level. In some cases a distinction is made for the capital city.  Yet it is also feasible to look 
at disaggregated impacts using poverty mapping techniques to assess which geographical areas are most 
affected by rising prices.  As discussed by Elbers et al. (2003), the idea behind poverty maps is 
straightforward, but its actual implementation is complex. Essentially, a regression is estimated using 
household survey data and its key parameters used to predict the level of consumption of all households 
listed in a census.  These predicted household expenditures are then used to construct poverty indicators for 
small geographic population subgroups. To assess how the increase in food prices is likely to affect 
households living in various areas of a country, Coulombe and Wodon (2008) complement existing poverty 
maps with new maps relying on a revised consumption aggregate that takes into account the impact of the 
price increase.  By comparing the initial poverty map with the revised poverty map based on the new 
consumption aggregate, one obtains estimates at a disaggregated geographic level of the impact on poverty 
of the price shock.   
  The relationship between initial poverty and the change in poverty by area is visualized in Figure 3 
for four countries: Ghana, Guinea, Niger, and Senegal.  The scatter plots provide the initial level of poverty 
(measured through the headcount) on the horizontal axis and the change in poverty due to the increase in 
food prices on the vertical axis.  Only upper bound impacts are provided here (the lower bound impact 
results are in most cases similar).  In Ghana and Senegal, the authors find evidence of an inverted-U 
relationship between the change in poverty and the initial level of poverty.  For areas with very low poverty 
measures, the impact of the food crisis is not very large, as most households are not poor and able to cope 
with the shock.  For the very poor districts, the impact is also not very large, because many households are 
protected from the increase in prices because they are net sellers of food or rely in large part on auto-
consumption in order to meet their basic food needs.  The areas most affected are those who are in the 
middle-ground with initial poverty levels in the 30% to 60% range (many of these areas are urban).  In the 
other two countries, there is however a clear negative relationship between initial poverty and the change in 
poverty suggesting that the hardest hit areas are not the poorest.   
 
 Figure 2: Change in Poverty and Initial Poverty in four West African Countries 
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Source: Coulombe and Wodon (2008). 
 
  Impacts differ substantially between areas, which poses a dilemma for policy-makers.  On the one 
hand, the desire to help households cope with the increase in food prices may lead policy-makers to 
implement safety net interventions in the hardest hit areas.  On the other hand, these hard hit areas are not 
among the poorest in the country. Hence the effectiveness of the country’s overall poverty reduction 
strategy may be jeopardized if public resources are diverted from the poorest areas to less poor areas to 
address the food crisis. We turn in more details to the issue of policy responses to the food crisis in the next 
section. 
 3.  Policy Responses to Rising Food Prices in Sub-Saharan Africa 
3.1 Typology  of  Policies 
Countries vary widely in the type of policies or programs they are able to introduce to respond to 
rising commodity prices. A recent paper based on a survey of 118 country teams and country economists 
carried out by the World Bank in March 2008 shows that in sub-Saharan Africa, the most common policy 
response was to reduce foodgrain taxes - either tariffs, VAT, other sales tax or a combination of these 
measures (Revenga et al. 2008) On the other hand, the most common response outside sub-Saharan Africa 
was some form of consumer subsidy or price control which over half of countries outside of sub-Saharan 
Africa used to stabilize domestic prices (see Figure 3).  These price controls have a long history in several 
countries. For instance formal or tacit agreements between producers and the Government on either actual 
prices or profit margins are common for basic staples in Eastern Europe. In the Middle East and North 
Africa, subsidies on key items are an important part of the social compact between the State and citizens. In 
contrast, only 22% of sub-Saharan African countries used some form of price control. This lower share is 
likely due to the greater fiscal and administrative constraints in Africa relative to non-African countries.  
  Close to a third of countries outside sub-Saharan Africa used foodgrain stocks to increase domestic 
supply and curb prices compared with around 20% of African countries. Export restrictions were also 
slightly more common outside sub-Saharan Africa (28% of countries) compared with countries within 
Africa (21%). A significantly larger share of sub-Saharan African countries (42%) did not use any of the 
‘economy-wide’ policies discussed above, compared with non-African countries. The likely reasons are (i) 
the greater diversity of diets and import dependence across sub-Saharan Africa has meant that certain 
countries have insulated themselves from higher global prices than outside Africa and (ii) the smaller and 
resource-poor countries in Africa have fewer administrative and fiscal means to implement these measures. 
For instance the reduction in import tariffs and taxes on foodgrains in Benin is equivalent to 9% of its 2008 
Budget. 
  The second broad type of policy response revolves around using existing safety net instruments to 
either increase benefit levels or increase beneficiary coverage. The authors show that sub-Saharan African 
countries have a significantly larger share of food based safety net programs relative to non-African 
countries – school feeding, food for work and food ration programs.    However, while many countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa have food-based transfer programs, the coverage of these programs tends to be very 
limited (in part due to lack of financing), so that the programs also have a limited impact.  
  The third type of policy measure involves supporting domestic food production. Free or subsidized 
input distribution or subsidized agricultural credit schemes are common responses. The use of new 
technology has contributed to an 8% increase in rice production in sub-Saharan Africa in 2007/08 relative 
to the previous year. Over the medium run African countries, through the NEPAD mechanism, have committed to increasing their investments in agricultural research and extension as well as on irrigation and 
new technology. However, it will take some time for these policies to have a significant impact.  
 
Figure 3. Food Price Policies of African countries 
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  Country examples are illustrative of the mix of immediate policy responses. Liberia’s response 
revolved around reducing import taxes on foodgrains and scaling up targeted feeding programs. Kenya is 
building its food stocks by raising domestic maize procurement prices by 30% and importing three million 
metric tones of maize. Kenya is also subsidizing fertilizers and is facilitating access through Government 
imports and a credit scheme. Guinea is considering a targeted consumer subsidy for rice and expansion of 
an existing school feeding program to urban areas. Cameroon has sharply reduced VAT and customs duties 
on basic food staples as well as on imports of agricultural inputs while its government has also raised civil 
service wages.  We turn next to assessing the extent to which the poor benefit from three types of policy 
choices.  
 
3.2.    Economy-Wide Policies: The Case of Indirect Tax Cuts 
In this section and the next, we provide a preliminary assessment of the targeting performance of 
some of the policies implemented by governments to cope with the food price crisis.  Forty percent of sub-
Saharan Africa governments have reduced taxes levied on food items, such as import taxes and value added 
taxes in order to deal with the increase in food prices.  The implicit assumption is that a reduction in these taxes would be passed on by intermediaries to consumers.  Even if there were such a pass-through or trickle 
down, it is not clear that a reduction in indirect taxes is a good policy for helping the poor.  For a start, 
reductions in indirect taxes rates can have significant fiscal costs and lead to cuts in pro-poor spending 
(IMF 2008). Furthermore, if a large share of targeted food items is consumed by the non-poor, other policy 
instruments to help the poor cope with the crisis may have a stronger impact on poverty reduction at a 
lower cost.   
  Wodon et al. (2008b) estimate to what extent the poor are likely to benefit from a reduction in 
indirect taxes.  The authors provide data on the consumption of various imported foods for the same set of 
West and Central African countries discussed earlier. The analysis is focused on rice, flour and bread, 
maize, vegetable oil, sugar, and milk, because these are food items that tend to be imported to a large extent.  
Table 1 provides results for rice. The most important variable in the table is the share of a staple’s 
consumption that is accounted for by the poor.  Indeed, the higher this share is, the more likely it is that a 
reduction in the price of the good following a reduction in indirect taxes will help in reducing poverty (on 
the impact of indirect tax reforms on poverty, see Makdissi and Wodon 2002, and Duclos et al. 2008).  The 
share of the population that is poor varies between countries (from 28.5% in Ghana to 71.3% in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo according to recent poverty assessments completed at the World Bank), so 
that for cross-country comparisons, it is easier to consider the share of total consumption accounted for by 
the bottom 40% or 60% of the population (these two proportions were chosen because for most countries, 
the poverty rate falls between these two values).   
  Consider the share of rice consumption in the bottom 40% of the population.  This share varies 
from 11% in Mali to 32% in Sierra Leone.  This means that if one considers the bottom 40% as the poor, 
out of every dollar spent by a government for reducing indirect taxes on rice, and assuming that the indirect 
tax cuts results in a proportionate reduction in consumer prices, only about 20 cents will benefit the poor on 
average.  In Guinea for example, the share of rice that is consumed by the bottom 40% of the population is 
only 23%. In Liberia, the share is at 22%.  If the bottom 60% of the population is considered as poor, the 
share of subsidies or tax reductions that would reach the poor would be higher, at 25%-54%, but this still 
does not suggest good targeting.  For most of the other imported foods for which indirect tax cuts have 
been implemented or considered by governments, the proportions of those foods consumed by the poor 
tend to be even lower than what is observed in Table 2 for rice.   
 Table 1: Basic Statistics on the consumption of rice in selected West and Central African countries 
Food item  Share in  Proportion  Share consumed  Share consumed 
  Total consumption  Consumers  by bottom 40%  by bottom 60% 
Burkina Faso (2003; poverty at 46.4%)  3.6  60.2  13.4  25.6 
D. R. Congo (2005; poverty at 71.3%)  3.2  57.3  15.5  31.7 
Gabon (2005, poverty at 32.7%)  3.0  91.4  31.7  51.1 
Ghana (2006, poverty at 28.5%  3.1  74.6  16.4  33.0 
Guinea (2003, poverty at 49.1%)  13.0  90.7  23.1  42.8 
Liberia (2007, poverty at 63.8%)*  13.2  84.9  22.3  41.2 
Mali (2006, poverty at 47.5%  7.2  95.1  11.1  25.1 
Niger (2005, poverty at 62.1%)*  4.4  54.7  14.8  31.4 
Nigeria (2004, poverty at 54.7%)  4.1  73.4  14.0  30.2 
Senegal (2006, poverty at 50.8%)  6.8  96.3  28.0  47.9 
Sierra Leone (2003, poverty at 66.4%)  11.7  96.4  32.0  53.9 
Togo (2006, poverty at 61.6%) 3.5  92.2  23.0  40.4 
Source: Wodon et al. (2008b).  The date in parenthesis for each country refers to the household survey year. 
 
Thus, while reducing taxes is one of the first actions that governments are considering to reduce the 
impact on the poor of rising food prices in sub-Saharan Africa, this measure suffers from several 
weaknesses.  First, it is costly in budgetary terms. For instance the reduction in import tariffs on rice 
imports in Guinea-Bissau is estimated to cost about 7% of tax revenues worsening an already tight fiscal 
balance.  Second, there is no guarantee that the tax cuts will end up reducing the market prices of the goods 
targeted, particularly in markets dominated by a few traders.  Third, for many food items, even if there is a 
one-to-one relationship between taxes and market prices, much of the benefit of the tax cuts will accrue to 
the non-poor.  Fourth, compared to reducing VAT or a sales tax, lowering import tariffs may well hurt 
domestic producers in the short run, and in some circumstances reducing import tariffs may increase 
poverty (Makdissi and Wodon 2008a). Hence the decision to reduce tariffs should balance the benefits 
which the poor are likely to accrue and political economy gains, with the costs outlined here.  
 
3.3.    Safety Net Programs – Food Aid and School Feeding 
  Alternatives to economy-wide policies such as indirect tax cuts consists in implementing new 
social protection programs and safety nets, or expanding existing ones.  In their comprehensive review of 
the targeting performance of a wide range of safety nets, Coady et al. (2003) suggest that food subsidies 
tend to be less well targeted than other programs.  As discussed in World Bank (2008b), direct transfers in 
cash or in kind, whether through proxy-means testing programs or public works for example, tend to have 
better outcomes.  It is unclear however whether broad assessments of the targeting performance of 
alternative mechanisms of social protection are necessarily valid for sub-Saharan Africa since few of the 
case studies analyzed in existing reviews of social protection programs tend belong to the region. 
In this section and the next, three types of food-based safety nets are considered: food aid as 
typically distributed by the World Food Program (WFP), school feeding programs, and labor intensive 
public works which often are based in part on food for work systems (but may also provide benefits in cash through wages).  There has been some debate on the targeting performance and especially the impact of 
food aid in East and Southern Africa
4.  In the case of food aid and school feeding programs, we provide 
summary results from studies looking at who benefits from these programs in two countries.  Unfortunately 
while data on food consumption are available in household surveys for most African countries, and while 
many countries have food distribution programs (albeit of small scale in many instances), very few 
household survey questionnaires include questions on who benefits from existing food distribution 
programs.  In West and Central Africa, two exceptions are Burundi and Liberia.  The analysis of the 
surveys for these two countries suggests that while in principle, food aid should be well targeted, in practice 
it is often difficult to achieve good targeting, especially in post-conflict countries with weak governance.  
In the case of public works, the results provided are based on simulations rather than existing programs.   
  Consider Burundi, a country that is suffering from a high level of food insecurity.  Zoyem et al.  
(2008) show that in 2006 more than half of the population had a caloric intake of less than 1,900 kcal per 
day per equivalent adult, insufficient to meet basic nutritional needs.  In the northern region of the country, 
almost half of the population had a daily caloric intake below 1,400 kcal.  In 2005, the WFP distributed 
food to 1.8 million people. The donations represented 3.4 % of the food consumption value of households. 
The question is whether such food aid distributions are well targeted to the poor.  The analysis of Diang’a et 
al. (2008) suggests that there are actually few differences in the likelihood of receiving food aid between 
various groups of households.  The share of total food distribution obtained by the poor was actually 
slightly lower than the share of the poor in the total population.  However, the WFP targeting performance 
was similar to that of health services, falling between the performances of primary and secondary education, 
and was much better targeted than subsidies for basic infrastructure services such as water and electricity or 
subsidies for tertiary education.  Still, one key reason for the limited targeting performance of the WFP 
seems to have been that in 2006 the program did not specifically target areas in the North where food 
insecurity was most severe – which it now does.  
  Food security also remains a major issue in Liberia.  Malnutrition affects a third of the children, 
and the recent increase in food prices is expected to have a significant impact on the population.  Analysis 
from a 2007 survey shows that almost a fourth of the population (22%) received some form of food aid.  
School feeding (meals or take home food) was the most common (74% of recipients of food aid), followed 
                                                 
4 As noted by Tsimpo and Wodon (2008), Little (2008) suggests that food aid in Ethiopia is limited and poorly timed, 
so that it does not lead to aid dependency among farmers who benefit from the aid.  By contrast Gelan (2006, 2007) 
reaches a different conclusion using a CGE model for Ethiopia (on the debate between cash and kind, see also Abdulai 
et al., 2005).  Different types of emergency food aid have been found to have different targeting performance as well 
as different impacts on poverty and household income growth by Gilligan and Hoddinott (2007), still using Ethiopian 
data.  Del Ninno et al. (2007) review the experience with food aid in two South Asian countries (India and 
Bangladesh) and two East African countries (Ethiopia and Zambia).  Their results suggest that while food aid can be 
beneficial under certain conditions, it is not in many cases the most efficient tool for addressing food insecurity (for 
other reviews of the literature on food aid, including in Africa, see Kirwan and McMillan, 2007 and Barrett and 
Maxwell, 2005). by public works projects and nutritional supplementation.  Similar to Burundi, estimates of the targeting 
performance of these programs suggest that non-poor households are essentially as likely to benefit from 
food aid as poor households.  There are differences in targeting estimates between programs (school 
feeding programs are slightly pro-poor, while other programs are slightly in favor of the non-poor), but 
these differences are not large for most programs (Tsimpo and Wodon 2008).   
  These two examples suggest that while food aid programs are likely to have a significant impact on 
their beneficiaries in post-conflict and very poor countries, it is not clear that the poorest and most 
vulnerable members of the population benefit more from these programs than the rest of the population.  
Given that emergency food needs will not disappear overnight in post-conflict countries, and that the recent 
food price crisis is likely to increase the need for aid, government and donors should not only focus on the 
need to increase food aid but also on the need to target it better.  In many countries, given large differences 
in consumption and nutrition levels between regions, geographic targeting could be used to improve the 
likely impact that the aid will have.  It is also important to ensure that distribution of rations take place 
during the lean seasons to relieve hunger until the next harvest, thereby avoiding households having to 
consume their seeds and preventing acts of survival with negative long-term consequences, such as the sale 
of family assets and production goods.  Beyond food distributions, other potential interventions include 
nutritional programs to reach children under five suffering from malnutrition and pregnant mothers (World 
Bank 2008b).  Finally, especially in post conflict countries, food aid probably needs to continue to target 
especially vulnerable groups such as refugees and returnees.  
 
3.3.    Safety Net Programs: Labor Intensive Public Works 
  Implementing or expanding labor intensive public works programs are another alternative being 
considered by governments confronted with rapidly rising food prices.  There is an extensive literature on 
the advantages and limitations of labor intensive public works for social protection and poverty reduction 
(for reviews, see among others Ravallion 1991 and 1999, von Braun et al. 1992, Subbarao, 1997 and 2003, 
Coady et al. 2003).   The implicit assumption is that such programs are relatively well self-targeted to the 
poor because they typically provide low wages so that only the poor are interested in participating in them, 
and that they provide direct cash or king benefits for program participants which may help in reducing the 
negative impact of higher food prices.  In addition, public works may help in reducing youth 
unemployment and underemployment, which is high in many countries. However, in the African context 
where a large share of the population is employed at very low wages or without pay, it is not certain à priori 
that public works are well targeted.  In addition, public works often suffer from substitution effects 
whereby program participants have to give up other employment in order to participate in public works, which may lead to only part of the wage outlays being effective in reducing poverty.  Finally, public works 
may entail substantial costs both in terms of administration and materials.   
  The experience with public works in Africa is mixed, and much of the published research deals 
with middle income countries such as Botswana and South Africa.  Haddad and Adato (2002) find that 
among a sample of public works projects in South Africa, about 90% outperformed an untargeted transfer 
scheme, but among community-based programs, performance was lower (Adato and Haddad 2002).  Teklu 
and Asefa (1997, 1999) find that in rural Botswana and Kenya, public works have had a substantial positive 
impact on the income of the poor, and that the poor are more likely to participate in the schemes than the 
non-poor.  Nevertheless, a substantial number of non-poor individuals also participate in the schemes, so 
that targeting performance could be improved.    
Using data from Chad, Ghana, Liberia, and Rwanda and simple simulation techniques, Wodon et al 
(2008c) provide some further empirical evidence on these issues and on the importance to complement self-
targeting with geographic targeting. The authors first assess who may be potentially interested in 
participating in a public works program by identifying working individuals in the household survey without 
pay, as well as for every level of proposed wage in the public works program, those individuals who work 
but now earn less than the public works wage.  The assumption is that all these individuals may be 
interested in participating in the program to increase their earnings.  They also consider as potential 
beneficiaries the unemployed whose reservation wage (the wage that they would like to get in order to 
work) is below the proposed public works wage.  Next, they randomly select a number of participants from 
among the pool of potential beneficiaries of the public works program so as to match a certain number of 
program participants.  Finally, they estimate for the assumed participants to the program two key 
parameters which affect the potential impact of the program on the poor: the targeting performance of the 
program, and the substitution effect of the program, whereby only part of the wages paid to beneficiaries 
generate additional income, because at least some of the beneficiaries would probably have done other 
work if they had not participated in the program.   
  The authors define the overall leakage rate as the share of program outlays that are likely not to 
raise the incomes of the poor, either because program participants are not poor, or because there is a 
substitution effect whereby some of the wages earned in labor intensive public works program are lost due 
to the fact that program participants must give up other work to participate in the programs.  When national 
public works programs are implemented, the leakage rates are very high, varying from 50% to close to 75% 
in all four countries.  Reducing the public works wage helps in reducing leakage rates, though by a small 
amount only.  By contrast, if the programs are geographically targeted, targeting performance can improve 
substantially.  In Ghana for example, while at the national level, the leakage rate is very high, at 73.2%, it 
could be as low as 17.9% in the Upper West region of the country.     Given that labor intensive public works program also entail substantial non-wage costs (either in 
the form of materials or in the form of administrative costs), it is very likely that only a small amount of the 
funds allocated to these programs would help in reducing poverty. However, one clear possibility to 
improve targeting performance is to implement labor intensive public works primarily in the poorest areas 
of a country.  In that case, targeting performance could be increased very substantially.  In Ghana for 
example, while at the national level, the leakage rate is very high, at 73%, it could be as low as 18% in the 
Upper West region of the country. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we had two main objectives.  The first was to review the evidence regarding the 
potential impact of the recent increase in food prices on poverty in sub-Saharan African countries.  The 
second was to document the policy responses adopted by governments to cope with this crisis, and assess 
the likely targeting performance of these policies in terms of reaching the poor. Two main findings stand 
out from our review. 
  First, the poor are likely to be significantly affected by the food price increases.  In West and 
Central Africa for example, the evidence suggests that an increase in the price of cereals of 50% could 
increase the share of the population in poverty by 4.4 percentage points if only the impact on consumers is 
taken into account.  Even when factoring in potential gains for producers, the headcount index of poverty 
would still increase by 2.5 percentage points.  In some countries, the impact should be limited, but in other 
countries that are highly dependent on food imports such as Liberia, the share of the population in poverty 
could potentially increase by eight percentage points with a 50% increase in rice prices.  If one considers an 
increase in the headcount index of 3.5 percentage point as a mid point, for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole 
this would imply that close to 30 million persons would fall into poverty.  
  Second, governments have various tools at their disposal to deal with the immediate impact of the 
increase in food prices, with important differences in the effectiveness of these tools.  In sub-Saharan 
Africa, some of the most commonly used policies to help populations cope are to reduce import taxes, and 
to expand food distribution programs and public works.  Tariff reductions on food are however likely to be 
relatively poorly targeted in many countries, although there are some exceptions. Indirect tax cuts are likely 
to have larger beneficial impacts for urban than for rural dwellers.  The desire of governments to protect 
urban dwellers from the increase in prices is understandable, since these are the population groups that tend 
to be affected by the largest shocks and are the most vocal about the crisis.  At the same time, many rural 
households are also likely to be hurt by the crisis. Given that rural households are much poorer than their 
urban counterparts, the consequences of higher food prices for them may be more dramatic.     Social protection programs tend to be better targeted than indirect tax cuts which benefit better-off 
households the most, but even for such safety nets the available information suggests that they can suffer 
from significant leakages to the non-poor.  The limited evidence available on feeding programs suggests 
that their targeting performance can be improved considerably.  As for public works, simulations suggest 
that even if wages are set at low levels, because so many individuals are unemployed or underemployed in 
sub-Saharan African countries, there is no guarantee that self-selection into these programs will lead to 
most of the benefits accruing .  However, when using geographic targeting, social protection programs have 
the potential of being well targeted so that scarce public funds end up providing relief to those in highest 
need.   
  The above diagnostic underscores the gravity of the food crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, and the 
difficulties ahead in responding to this crisis.  Given the absence of well targeted safety nets in many 
countries, it could be that some of the measures now being adopted by governments, will have only a 
limited impact in protecting the poor from the shock induced by the crisis.  At the same time, the data and 
the experience in some countries suggest that there are ways to ensure that social protection programs 
better reach the poor.  In addition, although medium to long term initiatives to boost food production have 
not been discussed here, these initiatives are clearly necessary in most of the affected countries both to 
stimulate growth and to exert downward pressure on prices.   
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